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Executive Summary
Situation overview
The Government of Montenegro has demonstrated a firm commitment to resolve their conventional ammunition 
problems, but lack the resources to do so.  The major problems include:
n	 The requirement to demilitarize over 9,900 tonnes of conventional 
ammunition.
n	 The requirement to dispose of 88 tonnes of Melange Oxidiser and 41 Tonnes 
of Tonka-type Fuel.  These are volatile, toxic and hazardous chemicals that 
present a major environmental risk to Kotor Bay.
n	 The requirement to immediately dispose of 25.8 tonnes of Napalm stored 
within the boundaries of Podgorica Airport.
n	 The requirement for physical infrastructure (storage and security) 
improvements, combined with demilitarization operations, to reduce the 
storage facilities of the Montenegro Armed Forces from 10 sub-standard 
facilities to 3 to NATO standards.
n	 The requirement for the development of an effective ammunition 
management system, (including physical inspection and chemical 
analysis capabilities).  Accounting procedures are good, but security and 
ammunition surveillance require improvement.
n	 The Montenegro Armed Forces do not possess the logistic transport lift capacity to move the ammunition to 
demilitarization facilities or for storage re-location.  Commercial transport to EU ADR standards is available, 
but it would be much more cost effective to improve the MAF capacity by the procurement of 6 x 8 Tonne 
Trucks.
n	 The security requirements for heavy weapons is a drain on MAF personnel resources.  Immediate disposal 
(at virtually no cost), through the Niksic Steelworks is the recommended option.  (There are 61 x Main Battle 
Tanks, 7 x Armoured Combat Vehicles and 84 Artillery pieces available for disposal).
Way ahead?
This report has identified that the situation can be resolved in the near to medium future (2007 - 2010) providing 
international donor support is provided.  It is proposed that a Montenegro Demilitarization Programme (MONDEM) 
be developed in partnership with an appropriate Implementing Agency,1 which should consist of the following 
component projects:
1 Through NATO PfP Trust Fund, OSCE Document on Conventional Ammunition or UNDP Country Office Podgorica.
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SERIAL PROJECT OUTPUT (S) ESTIMATED COSTS (US$) REMARKS
1 Disposal of Toxic Hazardous Waste
The disposal of the toxic 
hazardous waste that presents 
an environmental hazard to 
Kotor Bay in accordance with EU 
environmental legislation.2
650,000
	88 Tonnes Melange 
Oxidiser
	41 Tonnes TG-2 Fuel
	26 Tonnes Napalm
2
Conventional 
Ammunition 
Demilitarization
The demilitarization of 9,900 
tonnes of conventional ammunition 
and components in a safe, effective, 
efficient and environmentally benign 
manner.
4,922,000
	To be co-ordinated with 
USA OWRA bi-lateral 
support.
	Three phases.
	Infrastructure 
improvement.
	Equipment 
procurement.
	Transport procurement.
	Operating costs.
3
SALW (CA) Stockpile 
Management and 
Security
Improvements of the physical 
storage and security infrastructure 
to as close to NATO standards as 
possible.
The development of an ammunition 
and propellant chemical analysis 
capability.
Enhancement of current 
ammunition management systems.
788,000
	Infrastructure 
improvements at 3 
Depots.
	Development of 
propellant test capacity.
	IT for ammunition 
management.
4 Recycling and Disposal of Heavy Weapons
The disposal of surplus heavy 
weapon systems by dismantling 
with the maximum recycling of 
materials.
100,000
	Costs dependent on 
sub-regional scrap 
prices.
	68 x ACV.
	84 x Artillery.
2 The disposal of the Napalm at Podgorica Airport should also be considered part of this component.
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Acronyms
AAM Air-to-Air Missile
AASTP Allied Ammunition Storage and Transport Publications (NATO)
ADF Ammunition Demilitarization Facility
AGM Air to Ground Missile
APB Ammunition Process Building
APE Ammunition Peculiar Equipment
ASS Ammunition Storage Sites
ATA Ammunition Technical Assessment
ATO	 Ammunition	Technical	Officer
AUW All Up Weight
BATNEEC Best Available Technology Not Entailing Excessive Costs
BCPR  Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (UNDP) 
BiH  Bosnia and Herzegovina
CMD Conventional Munition Disposal
COTS Commercial Off The Shelf
CTA Chief Technical Advisor (SALW)
ECA Explosion Consequence Analysis
EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal
ELL Explosive Limit License
ESA Explosive Storage Area 
ESH Explosive Storehouse 
EU European Union
EUSAC EU SALW Control (Project)
EWI Explosive Waste Incinerator
HCC Hazard Compatibility Code
HD Hazard Division (UN)
HPLC High Performance Liquid Chromatography
IQD Inside Quantity Distances
IRFNA Inhibited Red Fuming Nitric Acid (Fuel)
IT Information Technology
MAF Montenegro Armed Forces
MANPADS Man Portable Air Defence Systems
MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MHE Mechanical Handling Equipment
MLRS Multi Launch Rocket System
MoD Ministry of Defence 
MOI  Ministry of Internal Affairs 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NEQ Net Explosive Quantity (Alternatively NEC (Net Explosive Content))
OBOD Open Burning and Open Detonation
OQD Outside Quantity Distances
OSCE  Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
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PES Potential Explosion Site
PM Project Manager
RFNA Red Fuming Nitric Acid (RFNA)
SAA Small Arms Ammunition
SAADS Small Arms Ammunition Disposal System (Commercial)
SALW Small Arms and Light Weapons
SAM Surface to Air Missile 
SEE South Eastern Europe
SEESAC  South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for SALW Control 
SOP Standing (Standard) Operating Procedure
TNT Trinitrotoluene (Trotyl)
TOR Terms of Reference
ULC Unit Load Container (Pallets)
UNDP United Nations Development Programme 
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Ammunition Technical Assessment of Montenegro
1 Introduction 
Following the results of the 21 May 2006 referendum, the Republic of Montenegro declared independence 
from the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro (SCG) on 03 June 2006. The division of the SCG State Union 
into two independent republics has created additional SALW and arms control challenges within Montenegro, in 
particular the stockpile management and demilitarization of ammunition. New primary and secondary legislation 
is being created, and Montenegro is in the process of formally aligning itself to current regional and international 
SALW related agreements. Montenegro’s capacity to fulfil such obligations is under development, and they have 
a responsibility to move towards compliance with the following:
n	 EU Code of Conduct;
n	 OSCE Document on Small Arms;
n	 OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition;
n	 OSCE Decision on End-User Certificates;
n	 OSCE Decision on Brokering;
n	 OSCE Decision on MANPADS;
n	 Stability Pact SALW Regional Implementation Plan (Revised May 2006);
n	 United Nations Programme of Action; and
n	 United Nations Firearms Protocol.10
Montenegro is now a member of the UN and OSCE, and is therefore already committed to a number of the above 
international instruments that require information exchange. 
The Government of Montenegro has now begun the process of forming new, professional armed forces for the 
self-defence of the country in line with NATO standards. As a result of the defence reform process, the Ministry of 
Defence has requested international assistance to support stockpile management processes and the resultant 
requirement to demilitarize the significant quantities of heavy weapons systems11 and several thousand tonnes 
of explosive ordnance12 that are surplus to the future requirements of the Montenegro Armed Forces (MAF). 
The Ministry of Defence1 requested that the UNDP Office in Montenegro assist them in the evaluation of their 
ammunition storage capabilities and the planning of a safe, effective, efficient and environmentally benign 
  EU Code of Conduct for Arms Export, 08 June 1998.
  OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons, (FSC.JOUR/314), 24 November 2000.
  OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition, (FSC.DOC/1/03), 19 November 2003.
  OSCE Decision on End-User Certificates and Verification Procedures for SALW Exports, (FSC.DEC/05/04), 17 November 2004.
  OSCE Decision on Principles for the Control of Brokering in SALW, (FSC.DEC/8/04), 24 November 2004.
  OSCE Decision on Man Portable Air Defence Systems. (FSC.DEC/07/03), 23 July 2003.
  United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, 
(UN Document A/Conf.192/15), July 2001
10  Protocol against the Illicit manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, (The Firearms Protocol). Entered into Force on 03 July 2005.
11  Armoured Fighting Vehicles (AFV) and submarines.
12  Anti-vehicle mines, underwater sea mines, torpedoes, missiles, rockets, SAA, medium and heavy calibre ammunition and related 
materials.
1  On 07 November 2006, the Government of Montenegro submitted its list of needs for defence reform to the South Eastern Europe 
Clearinghouse (SEEC) Initiative. In response to Montenegro’s request to the SEEC Initiative, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of 
Montenegro accepted the UNDP Resident Representative’s proposal to provide UNDP demilitarization assistance at a meeting held in 
Podgorica on 27 November 2006.
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demilitarization operation, (which wherever possible will use the local capacities in Montenegro to destroy the 
surplus equipment and ammunition in line with international best practices).  UNDP Montenegro, in cooperation 
with SEESAC, therefore arranged for an Ammunition Technical Assessment to assess the condition of the 
ammunition stockpile, to ascertain the extent of demilitarization needs and capacities within Montenegro and 
to devise a plan to safely and efficiently destroy all materials earmarked for destruction. The detailed tasks 
included:
n	 The provision of technical advice on the further development of an appropriate and effective ammunition 
stockpile management system.
n	 The identification of the ammunition demilitarization requirements of the Government of Montenegro, and 
their capacity to develop and implement an effective Demilitarization Plan in accordance with international 
best practices.
n	 Ensuring close liaison with technical representatives from partner organizations and other interested 
stakeholders.
2	 Ammunition	management	system
2.1 Overview
There is an ammunition management system in place that pre-dates the State Union between Serbia and 
Montenegro. No new management system has been developed, and the capacity within Montenegro to either 
implement the old system or develop and implement a new system to international best practices is very limited. 
The government has informally indicated its desire to move towards compliance with the principles contained 
within the NATO Allied Ammunition Storage and Transport (AASPT) publications, and a full translation of AASPT 
has been forwarded to the Ministry of Defence by UNDP.
2.2 Ammunition stockpile locations and levels
2.2.1	 Ministry	of	Defence
The Ministry of Defence of Montenegro currently has ammunition stored in nine locations, although the aspiration 
is to reduce this to three locations as soon as is practicably possible.  This requires the establishment of a 
demilitarization capability to reduce the national defence stockpile from approximately 11,700 tonnes to ,000 
tonnes.
LOCATION FUTURE	STORAGE	NEEDS	(TONNES)14
CURRENT	STOCKPILE	
LEVEL	(TONNES) REMARKS
Brezovik 1,450 - 1,560 7,000 This is planned to be one of the remaining ammunition depots post-restructuring.
Opatovo 0 700
Petrovići 0 800
Pljevlja 40 - 50 400 This is planned to be one of the remaining ammunition depots post-restructuring.
Pristan 0 500
Rogame 0 500
Sasovići 0 1,000
Spiljići 0 50
Taras 500 - 600 750 This is planned to be one of the remaining ammunition depots post-restructuring.
TOTALS 2,200 11,700
Table 1: Montenegro ammunition storage summary
14 Figures provided by Colonel Vuksanovic, J-4 General Staff
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2.2.2 Ministry of Interior
The Ministry of Interior has indicated an interest in participating in this assessment, but as their plans for the 
future police and border police structure are still being developed the future ammunition requirements are 
still uncertain. Manual accounting systems are used due to a lack of IT support, however physical security is 
assessed as good.
There are small quantities of ammunition stored with local police units, and relatively large quantities of small 
arms ammunition (mostly 7.62mm) stored at the Police Headquarters. There are also hand grenades, medium 
calibre mortar, 40mm and anti-tank ammunition stored on the ground floor of two buildings in the Police 
Headquarters in the middle of the city. This ammunition is earmarked for destruction and could be easily fitted 
in with the demilitarization of the ammunition of the armed forces.
It is recommended that the main police stockpile should be stored in a central location, with only minimal levels 
of operational small arms ammunition been held at the local police station level.  The MoI should negotiate with 
the MOD to either; 1) store MoI with MOD ammunition at one of the three future sites; or 2) take over a small 
military storage site for MoI use, (Rogame being a strong possibility).
2.3 Ammunition management system of ‘VJ’
The ammunition management system in use is based on the old Law on ‘Protection at Work in the Production of 
Explosives and Propellant Powders and on Handling Explosives and Propellant Powders’, dated 25 December 
1969. The law mostly deals with protective measure in relation to the production of all kinds and types of 
explosive substances, fuzes, propellant charges and electric fuzes and detonators, it also deals in Chapter XVIII 
with ‘Protection Measures for the Storage of Explosive Materials in Magazines and for their Handling’. In a 
number of tables safety distances are given that are comparable with the distances given in AASTP-1.
The law has been applied using an ‘Instruction for Accommodation and Handling on Munitions and Mine Explosive 
Means’ for the Armed Forces. This instruction was first published in 1970 and a new version was published in 
2004.  It is recommended that this be reviewed against NATO AASPT and any necessary revisions then made.
The current system includes; 1) periodic inspection of the ammunition; and 2) a card indexing system that is also 
transformed into digital data, which is present at both the unit and General Staff level. Movement of ammunition 
and / or explosives needs to be approved by the General Staff.  Stocktaking occurs monthly at unit level and 
annually at the General Staff level. The quality system in place is comparable to the NATO classification system 
for the quality of ammunition and explosives.
 Ammunition stockpile stability
The stability in storage and degradation, or deterioration, rates of the explosive content will influence the degree 
of urgency for disposal, ability to safely move ammunition, demilitarization techniques that can be used and 
hence the overall destruction methodology.  
3.1 High Explosives
With high explosives, long-term stability is not considered to be a problem that could compromise safety, 
providing reasonable levels of storage are maintained.   An efficient routine inspection programme will normally 
be sufficient to monitor the general condition of ammunition for signs of exudation of the main filling and other 
indications of deterioration, such as corrosion.  
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3.2 Propellants1
.2.1 Chemical stability
The primary risk is that of autocatalytic decomposition of propellant, which has the potential to result in 
spontaneous ignition leading to mass explosions in ammunition storage areas.  Such explosions will result in the 
requirement for long, dangerous and expensive explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) clearance operations.  Only 
effective ammunition surveillance systems combined with an effective explosive test laboratory can quantify this 
risk.  (Further information on propellant instability can be found at Annex A). There has been recent incident in 
Serbia (Paracin - October 2006), which has officially been attributed to propellant instability.
.2.2 Propellant Master Sampler
The propellant master sampler also dates back to the State Union between Serbia and Montenegro. Due to 
the unsuitable climatic environment1 that much of the ammunition has been stored in over the last ten years, 
combined with the current demilitarization requirements, there is a requirement for an effective national system. 
The main options are; 1) opening negotiations with the Republic of Serbia Ministry of Defence to assess whether 
Serbia continues master propellant sampling; or 2) the development of a national propellant test and analysis 
capacity. 
The problem remains however, that the propellant master samples held in Serbia are in ‘ideal storage conditions’, 
whilst the ammunition in Montenegro is not, and has not been for some time.  Therefore reliance on the Serbia 
master propellant samples as an indication of the condition and safety of Montenegro’s propellant would increase 
risk.  Sampling of the actual propellant in storage in Montenegro should be conducted to identify divergence with 
the ‘master samples’.
During visits to the potential companies that could be involved in the demilitarization process it became clear 
that laboratory capacity is available and only needs to be improved to carry out these tests. Consideration should 
therefore be given as a priority to the provision of financial support to upgrade the analytical capabilities of the 
Montenegrin Ministry of Defence.  It is proposed that a physical method of analysis for stabiliser content (HPLC1) 
and a more rapid chemical method for accelerated ageing (Bergmann-Junk Test) are used.  This proposed solution 
will provide results at a rate needed to give a complete surveillance within two years. The estimated cost of such 
a system would be in the region of US$ 125,000.   
3.3 Physical degradation of ammunition
This can impact on the inherent safety of safe to arm mechanisms and fuzing systems, or lead to explosive 
exudation.  This risk again requires an effective physical examination component of the ammunition surveillance 
system.  The Montenegrin Armed Forces appear to have a limited surveillance system in place to identify these 
risks.
 Ammunition stockpile storage conditions
The physical condition of the ammunition storage areas, combined with the ‘safety distances’1 to civilian areas, 
will determine the achievable safe storage levels of ammunition for the future.  Safe storage levels for future 
storage requirements can be achieved by limited infrastructure development, (within appropriate legislative 
1   S.G. Murray, Propellant Stability Analysis, Albanian Demilitarization Study, 31 March 2000.
1  A significant quantity of ammunition has been stored in the open or in storehouses with ineffective climatic and humidity controls.  The 
resultant diurnal cycling will have accelerated the ‘aging’ of the propellant, and therefore stabiliser levels may be significantly divergent from 
those in the ‘master samples’.
1  High Performance Liquid Chromatography.
1  Outside Quantity Distances (OQD) being the technical term.
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amendments and requirements).  The following matrix summarises the current condition of the MOD ammunition 
storage areas, (Annexes B to J provide more detailed analysis):
LOCATION CONDITION OF ESH1
ADEQUATE 
IQD20 TO NATO 
STANDARDS
ADEQUATE 
OQD21 TO NATO 
STANDARDS
STORAGE LIMIT TO 
NATO STANDARDS 
(TONNES AUW)
REFERENCE
Brezovik FAIR YES YES22 2,100 Annex B
Opatovo UNFIT NO NO 0 Annex C
Petrovići UNFIT NO NO 0 Annex D
Pljevlja FAIR YES YES 220 Annex E
Pristan FAIR NO NO 0 Annex D
Rogame FAIR YES YES 0 Annex F
Sasovići FAIR NO NO 0 Annex G
Spiljići FAIR NO NO 0 Annex D
Taras FAIR YES YES 1,100 Annex H
Air Force UNFIT NO NO 0 Annex I
TOTALS 3,420
Table 2: Summary of Montenegro ammunition storage areas
4.1 Explosives Limit Licences (ELL) to NATO standards
The NATO AASTP2 defines internationally accepted safety distances to be followed for the safe storage of 
ammunition and explosives in order to reduce the risk to the general public to an acceptable level. The application 
of NATO AASTP principles to the selected future ammunition storage areas would produce the following estimated 
explosive limits:
.1.1 Brezovic ammunition storage area
Future storage limitations were discussed with the General Staff, 
during which it was determined that the Explosive Store Houses 
(ESH) facing the civilian houses in the valley would not be used in 
the future.  The remaining ESH can then achieve acceptable Internal 
Quantity Distances (IQD), with an Outside Quantity Distance (OQD) 
of greater than 650 metres (D13>400 metres). Therefore each of 
the large ESH can store 25 tonnes NEQ. The total for the complex is 
then 15 x 25 tonnes = 375 tonnes NEQ. 
The assumption is then made for estimation purposes that the 
ratio between NEQ and AUW equals 6. It follows that the total AUW 
storage capacity for Brezovic is 6 x 375 tonnes = 2,100 tonnes. (Although the Units of Space (UOS) available is 
greater, the final storage figures will depend on types of ammunition).
The total storage capacity for the depot will be well within that required after restructuring of the Armed Forces.
1 Explosive Storehouse.
20 Inside Quantity Distances.  (The safety distance between individual explosive storehouses and ammunition processing areas).
21 Outside Quantity Distance.  (The safety distance from the ammunition storage area to civilian roads and habitation).
22 Under the assumption that the buildings facing the houses in the valley are not used.
2  Allied Ammunition Storage and Transport Publications.
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.1.2 Tara ammunition storage area
The distances of the ESH within the Taras ammunition storage area are all at appropriate IQDs. The distance to 
houses is >650 metres (D13>400 metres). Therefore each of the large ESH can store 25 tonnes NEQ. The total 
for the complex is then 7 x 25 tonnes = 175 tonnes NEQ. 
The assumption is made for calculating purposes that the ratio between NEQ and AUW equals 6. It follows that 
the total AUW storage capacity for Taras is 6 x 175 tonnes = 1,100 tonnes AUW. (Although the Units of Space 
(UOS) available is greater, the final storage figures will depend on types of ammunition).
The total storage capacity for the depot will be well within that required after restructuring of the Armed Forces.
.1. Pljevlja ammunition storage area
SER ES DISTANCE FROM PES ESH 1 (M)
QD 
REFERENCE
ELL LIMIT 
(KG) DISTANCEFUNCTION REMARKS
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G)
1 ESH 2 > 80m plus traverse No limit other than capacity per building
Table 3: Explosive Limit Licence for Pljevlja
The depot has no major restrictions that impact on explosive limits other than the maximum capacity per building, 
as there are no housing areas or public roads within approximately 1,000m.
4.2 Ammunition packaging
The majority of the ammunition in the storage depots is in its original 
packaging. Most of it is on pallets, but not all ammunition is palletised 
and the explosive storehouses are not conducive to the use of 
mechanical handling equipment, therefore all internal movements will 
have to be primarily manual. Aircraft bombs and some larger calibre 
munitions (130mm) are often stored outside as they are earmarked for 
demilitarization.
 Ammunition stockpile security
5.1 Ammunition accounting
Each storage site possessed ammunition accounts that appeared to 
be accurate, (for example in Brezovic a computerized print-out was 
provided). However, at the naval facilities at Pristan a computerized 
account of naval munitions was held in Excel as a personal file, which 
would not indicate that accurate centralized accounting was in place.
5.2 Physical security (ammunition storage areas)
Access denial systems are primitive and largely ineffective, and common problems include:
FACTOR COMMENTS
Perimeter security Perimeter security at storage sites is cursory and does not preclude intrusion by unauthorised personnel.
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FACTOR COMMENTS
Guard force
All sites, with the exception of Petrovici, have a permanent armed guard force that is an 
effective deterrent. However, often young recruits, in relatively small numbers, are used to 
guard these sites and it is unlikely they could effectively fend off any determined armed 
attack
Storehouse security
Storehouse security is cursory and ineffective:
• Inappropriate padlocks.
• Inactive intruder detection systems.
• Insufficient internal and external lighting.
Table 4: Security overview
5.3 Physical security (demilitarization facilities)
Overall, the security situation at the possible sites for development as Ammunition Demilitarization Facilities is 
more satisfactory than storage sites visited in Montenegro, as these sites are already operational ammunition 
and/or explosive processing/manufacture facilities.
The sites have security systems comparable to those of demilitarization facilities in Western Europe. Some repairs 
to perimeter fencing and intruder surveillance systems may be necessary to prevent accidental access.
 Ammunition transportation
There appears to be little routine movement of ammunition in Montenegro. At present some ammunition is moved 
to the storage depots that will be used in the future. The assessment team received conflicting information on 
security arrangements during transportation but the norm appears to include armed guards with convoys. 
There is extant legislation dealing with the transport of explosive materials. This is the Law on Foreign Trade with 
Weapons, Military Equipment and other Means, number SCG, br. 7/05, dated August 2005. The assessment 
team was also told that vehicles to be used for the transportation of ammunition, if not military vehicles, must 
comply with European ADR standards. Mr Zoran Begović, Chief of the Sector for Emergency Situations and 
Civil Security, of the Ministry of Interior and Public Administration, told the assessment team that all transport 
containing ammunition and/or explosives is regulated according to European ADR Standards. Transport licences 
for these movements are coordinated with the Ministries of Defence, Economy and in the case of transfers the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The Montenegrin Army has a small number of trucks (maximum 6 tonne capacity each), which are approximately 
40 years old.  The estimated maximum lift capacity of the Montenegrin Army is approximately 30 tonnes per 
trip, which is insufficient to support the movement of ammunition to the demilitarization facilities, even if vehicle 
reliability could be assured.
The only two options for ammunition transportation are; 1) the use of ADR certified commercial vehicles, at a 
rate of approximately € 5 per kilometre; or 2) the procurement of six 8 tonne capacity vehicles to enable the 
Montenegrin Army to transport its own ammunition.  The second option is recommended as it is cheaper,2 more 
efficient, reduces administration and provides additional logistic capacity development for the MAF.
 Ammunition demilitarization requirements and capability
7.1 Ammunition for disposal and demilitarization
The following table summarizes the demilitarization requirements of Montenegro.  The full data is attached at 
Annex K, and is also available in Excel format:
2  Assuming a requirement to move 6,000 tonnes of ammunition a distance of 200km (plus return empty journey of 200 km), on civilian 
transport (with limit of 6 tonnes, then the costs would be (6000/6)*400*5.00 = EURO 2M to hire vehicles.  Purchase of new vehicles is 
estimated to be less than USD 0.5M.
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GENERIC TYPE QUANTITY (TONNES AUW2)
FOR EXPORT 
TO US GOVT2 
(TONNES AUW)
US FUNDED 
DEMILITARIZATION 
(TONNES AUW) 2
QUANTITY FOR 
DEMILITARIZATION 
(TONNES AUW)
Small Arms Ammunition 
(14.5mm and below) 1,363.5 6.0 1357.5
Cannon Ammunition 
(20mm - 40mm) 542.1 542.1
Mortar Ammunition 
(60mm - 120mm) 1,199.2 1,199.2
Artillery Ammunition 
(105mm - 155mm) 763.1 763.1
Tank Ammunition (100mm) 421.2 421.2
MLRS Rockets (128mm) 11.8 11.8
Surface to Air Missiles 
(Strela and RZ 13) 198.2 198.2 0
Infantry Ammunition 
(Grenades etc) 445.3 445.3
Anti-Tank Mines 347.1 347.1
Bulk Explosive 355.8 355.8
Anti-Tank Rockets and Missiles 259.0 259.0
Naval Ammunition (Mines/Depth 
Charges) 804.1 804.1
Naval Ammunition (Torpedoes) 162.2 162.2
Naval Ammunition (Missiles) 1,984.1 1,984.1
Naval Ammunition (Gun 76mm) 162.4 162.4
Naval Propellants (See Later) 128.72 Separate Contract
Aircraft Bombs 725.3 725.3
Aircraft Fuzes 43.2 43.2
Air Force Napalm (See Later) 25.82 Separate Contract
Air Force Air-Ground Missiles 166.2 166.2
Miscellaneous 177.5 177.5
TOTALS 10,285.8 198.2 9,927.0
Table 5: Summary of Montenegro ammunition demilitarization requirements 2
In order to assess potential environmental impacts and the most appropriate demilitarization techniques it is 
important to know what explosive substances, propellant charges, oxidizers, fuels, electrolytes and miscellaneous 
articles are contained in the ammunition for demilitarization.  This information is at Annex L.
2 All Up Weight.  (The weight of the ammunition and its packaging).
2 Information received from the US Embassy in Podgorica during the ATA suggests that the US Government may: 1) procure small arms 
ammunition to supply ISAF in Afghanistan; and 2) contribute towards a bi-lateral demilitarization project. The initial demilitarization list 
was annexed in a letter from the Minister of Defence, Mr Boro Vucinic, File no 01-87/06-1, dated 12 December 2006 to the United States 
Ambassador in Podgorica.  The final list for US demilitarization support will be co-ordinated between the US State Department Office of 
Weapons Removal and Abatement (OWRA) and SEESAC. (See later).
2 The USA State Department (Office for Weapons Removal and Abatement (OWRA)) is considering a request for demilitarization support 
from Montenegro, (which includes MANPADS destruction).  The final USA support has yet to be determined, and will have to be co-ordinated 
with the other Implementation Agency (through SEESAC), to ensure synergy in terms of technology etc is achieved. This table can then be 
updated.
2 Not included in total.
29 Not included in total.
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7.2 Liquid propellants
In addition to the ammunition for demilitarization there is a large quantity of Oxidiser 
(AK-20K) (87.6 Tonnes) and Fuel (TG-2) (41.2 Tonnes) for liquid propellant systems for 
P20, P21 and P22 STYX Missiles.  When mixed these two chemicals create a highly 
volatile hypergolic reaction, and should uncontrolled mixing result due to leakage or 
the poor storage conditions a major deflagration event is inevitable.
These chemicals are kept in Pristan, partly in the open, and partly in buildings that 
have no ventilation or drainage channels. Due to the lack of appropriate storage 
conditions, and climatic conditions (humidity and high temperatures), the existing 
containers are corroded and are not hermetically sealed. The consequence is the very 
strong probability of uncontrolled evaporation of the chemicals into the atmosphere 
and the possibility of wider leakage.
.2.1 Fuel (TG-2)
The Fuel TG-2 is a mixture of technical isomers of xylidine0 and bi-tri-ethylamine, which is an oily liquid that easily 
vaporises under normal climatic conditions.  The colour varies from yellow to brown and it has the characteristic 
scent of oily amines. The technical data is as follows:
COMPONENT / ITEM % SPECIFIC WEIGHT
QUANTITY 
(LITRES)
QUANTITY 
(TONNES) UN DATA EU DATA
Xylidine (CH3)C6H3NH2 50.0
HCC - 1.6
UN Pack Group - II
Symbol - T NDi-ethylamine < 1.5
Tri-ethylamine > 48.5
TOTALS 100.0 0.85 48,420 41.16
Table 6: Technical Data for Fuel TG-2
The Fuel TG-2 is kept in 30 aluminium containers with a volume of 2m3, and also in steel drums with a capacity 
of 200 litres.  The actual storage breakdown between each is not known.
.2.2 Oxidiser (AK-20K)
The oxidiser is the most difficult to safely deal with. The Material Safety data Sheet (MSDS) for this substance 
contains the following warning:
POISON! STRONG OXIDISER. CONTACT WITH OTHER MATERIAL MAY CAUSE FIRE. CORROSIVE. LIQUID AND MIST CAUSE SEVERE 
BURNS TO ALL BODY TISSUE. MAY BE FATAL IF SWALLOWED OR INHALED.
The oxidiser AK-20K is an Inhibited Red Fuming Nitric Acid (IFRNA) derivative.  This is assessed based on a 
technical report and chemical analysis for the disposal of a similar substance by UNDP Bosnia in 2005.1  The 
substance in Bosnia was marked as AK-20 and was stored in identical containers.
COMPONENT % SPECIFIC WEIGHT
QUANTITY 
(LITRES)
QUANTITY 
(TONNES)
Nitric Acid (HNO3) 74.6
N2O4 < 22.5
H3PO4 
Hydrogen Fluoride (HF)
Water
< 4.4
TOTALS 100.0 1.60 54,740 87.58
Table 2: Technical Data for Oxidiser AK-20K
0  Known locally as Ksilidin.  Xylidine is also known as Dimethylaminobenzene, dimethylaniline, dimethyl-phenylamine, aminodimethyl benzene,
1  Technical Report on Kula 2, Dr T Linnert, 12 January 2005. (Obtained from UNDP Bosnia).
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It should be noted that a ‘standard’ IRFNA composition differs from that above, in that it would normally be 
expected to be:
COMPONENT / ITEM %
Nitric Acid (HNO3) 82
Nitrogen Oxide (NO2) 17
Hydrogen Fluoride (HF) <0.7
TOTALS 100.0
Table 3: Technical Data for ‘standard’ IRFNA
The decanting from the storage containers and subsequent dilution or neutralization of both the Fuel TG-2 and 
Oxidiser AK-20K is a complex process that should be conducted by an accredited chemical waste management 
company.
7.3	 Indigenous demilitarization capability
The General Staff indicated that there were five potential sites with some form of ammunition demilitarization 
capability. Four of these sites are already registered with the Central Registration and Licensing Agency (Centralni 
Registrar) for companies working with ammunition and explosives, that set rules, regulations and limitations on 
the type of activities the licensed company is allowed to conduct. One company is registered for steel production 
and one for waste disposal.
POTENTIAL DEMILITARIZATION FACILITY LOCATION
CENTRAL 
REGISTER 
APPROVED
SUITABLE FOR A NATIONAL 
DEMILITARIZATION FACILITY
AMMUNITION DEMILITARISATION OPERATIONS
Regional Centre for Underwater Demining (RCUD) Biejla NO NO
Booster Company Niksic YES YES (BUT)2
Yugo Import Company Podgorica YES NO
Poliex Military Facility Berne YES YES
4th November Military Facility Majkovac YES YES
SCRAP WASTE PROCESSING
Zeljezara Niksic AD Niksic YES FFE metal scrap processing
Hemosan Company Bar YES Hazardous waste disposal
Table 8: Montenegro potential ammunition demilitarization sites
..1 The Regional Centre for Underwater Demining (RCUD) (Bielja) 
The Regional Centre for Underwater Demining (Underwater EOD (UWEOD)) appears to be in an embryonic state. 
The purchase and support of the Biejla site and the conversion of the centre office and theory training facility 
is a positive start and demonstrates a strong Governmental commitment. The exact organizational position of 
the RCUD is complex; sponsored and chaired by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the MOD, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and other regional and national participants. 
The site and local environs have considerable potential for an UWEOD training and operational facility, but not 
for the industrial demilitarization of ammunition and explosives. There is insufficient safe and secure storage 
2 Limited NEQ.
 For steel production, not for ammunition and explosives.
 For contaminated waste disposal.
  SEESAC APD 16. Technical Assessment Regional Centre for Underwater Demining (RCUD) Republic of Montenegro, (2003-09-01). 
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for logistic scale operations and no capability to develop the necessary ammunition processing facilities at the 
location due to the presence of civilian habitation in the immediate area.  The potential for RCUD as a regional 
UWEOD Centre as a NATO PfP facility remains strong and should be further explored.
The Navy has no connection with this facility. The divers that are used to collect ammunition underwater are, 
according to the Navy, from a specialist Army unit. In the past ammunition from this site was transported to the 
Booster Company that is still awaiting destruction.
..2 The Booster Company (Niksic)
The Booster Company is privately owned, although little information could be gained as to their proposed future 
commercial activities and relationship with government.  The Booster Company has previously demilitarised anti-
tank mines and sea mines, and other explosive arising from the activities of the RCUD have also been stored 
with the company in the past.
The Booster Company is now in the process of establishing a new facility after an explosive accident destroyed 
their Vir facility in 2006. The new facility is small, and is approximately 200 metres from a railway and 400 
metres from a tunnel on the main road between Podgorica and Niksic. 
Although Outside Quantity Distances on the open side of the facility are appropriate to protect from the effects 
of direct blast, the short distances to the main road and railway through the mountain means that they would 
be both be very susceptible to ground shock from any undesirable explosive event within the Booster facility. 
The shockwave would travel the short distance to the railway and the tunnel, and the damage caused would 
be dependent on the quantity of explosives involved in any accidental high-order detonation.  The appropriate 
explosive licensing authority should now establish what the safe explosive limits of the Booster facility should be 
to protect the road and railway.
The new buildings are of an appropriate standard for ammunition storage and processing. The newly ordered 
equipment could not be shown to the assessment team, as it had not been delivered. 
Their demolition (OBOD) area is located high up in the mountains in an abandoned Bauxite mine. There is no 
habitation nearby and trucks can reach the area. New storage is foreseen in a former army storage building 
about 10 km outside Niksic. The building needs to be renovated before it can store any explosive substances.
The overall impression is that, once operational in approximately one month’s time, the Booster Company may 
be a possible candidate for demilitarization of a proportion of the ammunition.  The limitations on explosive 
limit licences (ELL) at their Niksic facility is a major factor, which would preclude the company from having the 
capability to deal with any significant demilitarization requirement.
.. Yugo-Import Company (Podgorica)
The Yugo-Import Company is a semi-government operated company. It serves as an umbrella company for four 
different companies, of which both the Poliex and ‘4 November’ companies are involved in ammunition and 
explosives related activities. Import and export activities, as well as production orders for these four companies go 
through Yugo-Import. As Yugo-Import is only involved in the management and administration it is not considered 
a demilitarization facility.
.. Poliex Company (Berane)
The Poliex Company is located in the north of the country. Poliex was established in 1982 as a part of UNIS 
Systems of Sarajevo, which specialised in the production of plastic explosives. Through its own research and 
development it managed to start the production of initiating devices for the mining industry. Poliex has experience 
in dealing with RDX (Hexogen), PETN and Ammonium Nitrate. The present production range is powder, plastic 
and emulsion explosives, together with electric and non-electric detonators.
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There is a testing laboratory present which does not have the capacity to 
conduct Propellant Sample Analysis but if the need is there the company 
is willing to invest in this area. By expanding the laboratory capacity it 
would even be possible that they could also conduct forensic tests for the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs.
The total complex is fenced with lighting poles at regular intervals all 
around. There is fire fighting equipment and an ambulance present. Apart 
from the production facilities, which are all up to standard, there are 4 
storage buildings of which three are being renovated to comply with NATO 
standards. Each building can store 50 tonnes NEQ and a total of 200 
tonnes AUW. There is a demolition / testing area and a demilitarization area. The latter is used to demilitarise 
TNT based naval mines. These mines were provided before the new General Staff was established and are not 
part of the list provided by the General Staff for demilitarisation to the assessment team.
.. ‘ November’ Company (Mojkovac)
The ‘4 November’ Company is a semi-government operated facility. The 
company is ISO 9001-2000 accredited by SGS AG.  The company has 
experience in the demilitarization of mortar and artillery fuzes, anti-
personnel mine fuzes, as well as with STRELA SAM. The demolition area 
has a maximum explosives limit of capacity of < 50 kg TNT equivalence 
per individual demolition. 
According to the management, the company has the capacity to deal with 
anti-aircraft and anti-tank rockets, all types of fuzes and all propellants. 
In demilitarization operations a written document is produced giving all 
necessary and mandatory safety and technical information, which is 
signed by the technical manager. An example for the demilitarization of 122mm ammunition was given. The 
company has no melting or steaming equipment for larger calibres.
Their major limitation is that they can only store up to one weeks production capacity, therefore efficient resupply 
of demilitarization stock would need to be guaranteed to ensure effective operations at this facility.  
The company showed its interest in the wooden packaging that will become available during demilitarization 
operations. A combination with, for instance, Poliex would be an advantage as both are semi-government 
operated and are not able to deal with the total problem independently. 
.. Zeljezara Niksic AD
The Niksic Steelwork Holding Company has been established through the transformation and division of property 
as a government owned enterprise, the former Niksic Steelworks, into a joint holding company of which 66% is 
in Australian possession. The Niksic Steelworks was founded in December 1950, and over the years it has been 
updated to more modern standards to handle an annual capacity of over 180,000 tonnes. 
The main metallurgical facilities in operation are:
n	 Two 60-tonne (30 MW) electric arc furnaces with ladle furnaces, treatment plants and a continuous 
caster.
n	 Blooming mill, continuous bar-rod medium and light section mill, cold strip rolling mill.
n	 Peeling and drawing plants.
36  SGS AG, 1 Place des Alpes, P.O. Box 2152, 1211  Geneva 1, Switzerland.
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Modern laboratory and mill equipment for quality control are present, and the company is ISO 9001-2000 quality 
certified by RW (TUV) (Germany).
The Director of the company indicated that they would be willing to purchase the scrap metal produced during 
ammunition demilitarization operations, provided that is was verified as ‘Free From Explosives’. The indicative 
prices quoted to the General Staff are shown below, although these will change with market price fluctuations 
and should be regarded as indicative only at this stage:
NIKSIC 
STEELWORKS 
CATEGORY
TYPE OF SCRAP
APPROXIMATE 
RECOVERY VALUE 
(US$/TONNE)
REMARKS
Category 1A Steel (> 10 mm) 240
Category 1B Steel (> 10 mm) 215 If company ships and cuts.
Category 2A Steel (6 - 10mm) 200
Category 2B Steel (< 6 mm) TBC
Table 9: Potential scrap recovery value (per tonne) from ammunition demilitarization 
The Niksic Steelworks has in the past been involved in the demilitarization of T-55 tanks.  The General Staff 
have a requirement for the disposal of the following heavy weapons.  Further details of the Heavy Weapons 
Demilitarization and Disposal options for Montenegro are contained in a separate document.
..1 The Hemosan Company
The Hemosan Company is located in Bar and is a private enterprise. It is certified to deal with contaminated 
waste and the environmental remediation of contaminated areas. According to its General Manager it is capable 
of dealing with the oxidizers and electrolytes from the torpedoes, and therefore could support the national 
demilitarization capability.  The financial regulations of any implementation agency would of course require that 
the Hemosan Company participated in a competitive tender process.
..2 External bi-lateral capacity and involvement
The US State Department Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (OWRA) has agreed to support the 
demilitarization of ammunition in Montenegro as a bi-lateral project, contracted to a US Company.  An initial 
list of possible ammunition for US demilitarization support was developed, but in order to ensure synergy, and 
maintain economies of scale for certain ammunition types, this list is currently being amended as the result of 
OWRA and SEESAC discussions.  
In addition, it is likely that 250,000 rounds of 7.62mm ammunition will be transferred to the ISAF in Afghanistan 
under the auspices of a US brokered transfer.  This proposed transfer has minimal impact on the proposed 
demilitarization plan.
 Ammunition demilitarization plan
8.1 Principles
n	Demilitarization operations should take place in Montenegro using indigenous capacity wherever possible. 
(The economies of scale support this principle in financial terms, and there is insufficient demilitarization 
capacity in the sub-region to accept this work in the short to medium term anyway).   
n	The Best Available Technology Not Exceeding Excessive Cost (BATNEEC) principle will be applied.
  Confirmatory letter from the Minister of Defence, Mr Boro Vucinic, File no 01-87/06-1, dated 12 December 2006 to the United States 
Ambassador in Podgorica.  
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n	Demilitarization operations will be environmentally benign, and comply with EU or national standards, (as 
appropriate).  Where possible (within the limitations of BATNEEC) the highest standards will be applied.
n	Maximum financial and recycling benefit should be extracted from materials recovered during the 
demilitarization process.  Recovered explosives to be used for commercial use only.
8.2 Technologies and demilitarization processes
There are a wide variety of technology options available throughout the world.  This assessment does not aim 
to include a full evaluation of the advantages and disadvantages of all available technologies. It does, however, 
propose to use those technologies with a proven track record that are available Commercially Off The Shelf 
(COTS).  The assessment team consider that Montenegro is not an appropriate environment to take a ‘technical 
risk’ in the development of new technology in parallel with trying to achieve significant production rates in the 
short term.
Ammunition, explosive, propellant and pyrotechnic materials fall into three basic treatment categories as 
illustrated in the table below.  The first category is material that is easy and relatively inexpensive to treat.  Simple 
technologies exist and are proven and relatively inexpensive.  The second category is material that is more 
difficult or risky to treat and more expensive to design for.  In the second category, multiple technologies might be 
required, and more handling and manipulation of the items prior to final disposal increases the risk and the costs. 
The third category is material that requires new development or technically challenging approaches to treat and, 
thus, becomes very expensive and risky.  Although materials in the third category of ‘difficult and very expensive’ 
are usually only a small percentage of the workload, they have the potential to absorb a disproportionate fraction 
of technical and financial resources.
CATEGORY DESCRIPTION GENERIC AMMUNITON TYPE
1
Simple
Inexpensive
(Minimal processing required)
	SAA up to 14.5 mm
	Fuzes, Igniters and Detonators (No Boosters)
	Bulk Gun Propellant
	Bulk Explosives (Non TNT Based)
	Some Landmines
2A
Difficult 
More Expensive
(Pre-processing before Incineration)
	Grenades
	Fuzes, Igniters and Detonators (With Boosters)
	Detonating Cord and Linear Charges.
	Cannon ammunition (20mm - 40mm)
2B
Difficult 
More Expensive
(TNT Recovery)
	Projectiles > 60mm (TNT based fill)
	Sea Mines (TNT Fill)
	A/C Bombs (TNT Fill)
3
Most Difficult 
Expensive
	Liquid Energetics
	Flares
	Projectiles (Non TNT Fill)
	Rocket Motors
	Torpedoes
Table 10: Demilitarization classification of generic ammunition types 
Past international experience shows that in a phased programme it is best to develop a track record with the 
simple items to establish in the minds of potential donors that the project can be a success; these are also often 
those items most desired by organised crime and warring factions. More difficult items can then be added with 
less risk that unsuccessful tests will hurt the project.  Conversely, if difficult items are unsuccessfully attempted 
early, the results must be explained before the project will be deemed successful.
15
Ammunition Technical Assessment of Montenegro 
(2007-03-04) 
1st Edition
8.3 Ammunition demilitarization plan (Phases)
The lowest risk approach to developing and operating the desired disposal facility is to implement the project by 
logical phases, which are proposed as follows:  
..1 Phase 1
In keeping with the ‘simple items first’ philosophy, it is proposed that the first phase should involve the destruction 
of technically simple items, which conveniently also addresses the need to destroy ammunition types that are 
attractive to criminals, terrorists and warring factions.  Phase 1 covers:
n	 The procurement and installation of a transportable explosive waste incinerator (EWI). It is proposed that 
this be operated by the ‘4th November’ Company, where it will be used to destroy small arms ammunition 
and small explosive components recovered during disassembly operations.  This location is suitable for 
ammunition demilitarization with low explosive contents, as their storage capability precludes the storage of 
commercially viable quantities of medium to large calibre munitions.
n	 The procurement and installation of a propellant test capability, to identify that propellant that may be at risk 
of autocatalytic decomposition.  
n	 Open burning operations to destroy’ at risk’ propellant (if necessary). Alternatively this propellant may be fed 
into the EWI, dependent on quantity identified.
n	 Infrastructure improvements to the three future ammunition storage areas to move them to as close to NATO 
standards as possible.
n	 Procurement of transport for the MAF to enable the safe and efficient movement of ammunition for 
demilitarization.
n	 The physical destruction of small arms ammunition, detonators, fuzes and propellant.
..2 Phase 2
n	 The procurement and installation of equipment in the Poliex Company to support reverse assembly, pull apart 
or remote cutting, to breakdown cannon, medium and large calibre ammunition prior to TNT recovery.
n	 The procurement and installation of equipment in the Poliex Company to support the autoclave (melt out) 
process to recover TNT from munitions.
n	 The procurement and installation of a flash furnace, (with integrated pollution control system), in the Poliex 
Company.  This is required to destroy explosive residues remaining after melt out before scrap metal from 
munitions can be sold for scrap.
n	 The physical destruction of mortar, tank and artillery ammunition (60mm - 155mm) by reverse assembly and 
melt out.
n	 The physical destruction of detonators, fuzes and propellant recovered during reverse assembly.  These will 
require packing and then moving to ‘4 November’ Company for destruction in the EWI.
.. Phase 
n	 The demilitarization of large naval ammunition at the Poliex Company.  Disassembly may be possible, but it 
is likely that hydro-abrasive cutting may be required to safely gain access to the TNT filled ammunition prior 
to melt out.
n	 A major problem with a significant quantity of the naval ammunition0 is that is the explosive fillings contain 
TAH-76 explosive (TNT/RDX/Aluminium), which it is not possible to melt out. Hydro abrasive cutting is a 
possible solution.
  Similar to the Small Arms Ammunition Destruction System (SAADS) that was installed in Bosnia in 2006 and is now operational. This has 
70% of the capabilities of the larger systems available at 25% of the costs.  The quantity of ammunition for incineration does not really justify 
the costs if a larger system anyway.
  Phase 3 could operate concurrently to Phase 2 dependent on donor response.
0  Sea Mine AIM-82, Sea Mine GMI-100 Rockan.  Total AUW of 255 tonnes.
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It is also important to note that each of these phases build on the previous one.  The preparation processes 
fielded in Phase 2 require that an incinerator be installed in Phase 1.  For example, fuzes, primers and boosters 
from munitions disassembled for TNT melt-out will be processed in the EWI.  Further, many parts of munitions 
that originally start in the Phase 3 category will probably be moved to the second category as their nature, and 
configurations are better known.  Some parts of these items will naturally fit in another category as the item is 
disassembled.  For example, rocket motor fuzes might revert to Phase 1 incineration, and torpedo warheads 
might be moved to TNT recovery in Phase 2.
8.5 Demilitarization scrap processing
The demilitarization process will result in large quantities of scrap material that will require processing, although 
a significant proportion of this could be sold, which would make a contribution to the operating costs of 
demilitarization.  It is not yet possible to estimate this in more detail.
8.6 Indicative demilitarization budget
An indicative budget for demilitarization operations has been developed, which is available as a separate EXCEL 
spreadsheet (on request).  It is summarised in this matrix:
PHASE ESTIMATED COSTS (US$)
TONNES 
(AUW)
COST($)  PER 
TONNE (AUW) REMARKS
Phase 1 (2007/8) 1,562,000 1,862.3
Phase 2 (2008/9) 2,295,000 4,349.1
Phase 3 (2009/10) 1,065,000 1,623.6
TOTAL 4,922,000 7,835.0 496
The total tonnage (AUW) is 9,927. The discrepancy of 2,092 tonnes 
from this figure reflects the weight of the non-explosive miscellaneous 
items, and the torpedo and STYX missile bodies, which can go straight 
to scrap after disassembly/checking.
Table 13: Indicative budget
Separate project proposals and budgets have also been developed for; 1) SALW (Conventional Ammunition) 
Stockpile Management and Security; 2) Disposal of Hazardous Chemicals; and 3) Disposal of Heavy Weapons. 
These will be made available by SEESAC to the selected implementation agency on request.
8.7 Environmental considerations
The assessment has examined the type of demilitarization and scrap processing equipment necessary to operate 
an ammunition demilitarization and scrap processing facility.  The environmental compliance of each type of 
equipment has been considered in accordance with European Union (EU) environmental legislation.
Other factors may need to be considered when identifying the impact on the local environment of the 
development of the recommended facilities for ammunition demilitarization production operations.  It is 
therefore recommended that environmental impact statements be developed during the project implementation 
phase to show that environmentally benign processes are taking place. These can then support the wider SALW 
Awareness campaign.
..1 Open Burning and Open Detonation (OBOD)
This practice of ammunition destruction can be problematic.   Local populations residing in close proximity to 
open detonation destruction sites in particular often complain and protest destruction activities.   Local residents 
cite two problems: first the loud noise and earth tremors that occur when destruction activities take place, and 
second, the increasing concentration of heavy metals that may accumulate close to areas where destruction 
takes place, which pose a hazard to both human and animal health. Further information on the environmental 
 Cost derived from Total AUW to include costs of processing missile and torpedo bodies etc.
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consequences of OBOD may be found in SALW ammunition destruction - environmental releases from open 
burning (OB) and open detonation (OD) events, SEESAC, 2004.
The proposed demilitarization plan for Montenegro keeps the use of OBOD to the minimum level necessary 
based on wider safety constraints; it will only be used for MANPAD destruction and large-scale propellant burning 
(if necessary for safety in storage reasons).
..2 European Union (EU) Environmental Legislation
There is a wide range of EU environmental legislation on the statute books of all EU members, which are all 
based on EU Directives from Brussels, to which the Government of Montenegro should aspire to comply with, 
in order to satisfy the requirements of international donors for financial assistance.  The one most applicable 
to demilitarization operations is the directive that lays down emission levels and rates.  All demilitarization 
equipment manufacturers are aware of this legislation in detail and can indicate to what level their products 
comply with this legislation.
It is therefore recommended that EU environmental legislation relating to emission levels be used as the basis 
for any Invitations To Tender (ITT) submitted, as this is the most stringent legislation in the region.
 Conclusions and recommendations
9.1 Ammunition Storage Areas
Before BREZOVIK and TARAS can be utilised for future ammunition storage in accordance with NATO standards 
appropriate Explosive Limit Licenses (ELL) should be formally developed after the necessary infrastructure 
improvements. 
The depots at BREZOVIK and TARAS are potentially fit to serve as central storage areas for the Montenegrin Army. 
The depot in PLIEVLJA is potentially fit to store the ammunition for the two battalions.
The roads in both the Brezovik and Taras compounds need to be repaired and covered with asphalt or a suitable 
layer.
9.2 Ammunition management
A propellant testing and analysis facility needs to be established or an agreement needs to be reached with the 
Republic of Serbia to conduct these tests for Montenegro.
9.3 Ammunition movement
Provide the Montenegro Armed Forces with a transport capacity for ammunition and explosives, as the renting 
of ADR certified civilian vehicles for transport is an expensive option and provides no long-term logistic capacity 
development.
9.4 Demilitarization (Ammunition)
The establishment of an Ammunition Demilitarization Facility in Montenegro is the only practical, safe and 
financially viable alternative for the medium term (2008>), with incineration technology providing an initial 
solution (2007) to the short term destruction of small arms ammunition, and propellant with chemical stability 
problems.  
  EU Directive 2000/76/EC of 04 December 2000 on Incineration of Waste.
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The demilitarization project should be carried out by an implementation agency with previous experience of the 
development, planning and conduct of demilitarization operations.
Maximum use should be made of locally available knowledge, infrastructure and personnel.
The indigenous capacity is limited to the POLIEX, ‘4 NOVEMBER’ and BOOSTER companies which are licensed 
and could be involved in the demilitarization activities, but their capabilities need to be improved to cope with the 
challenge.  Niksic Steelworks is capable of handling the resultant scrap processing.
The Hemosan Company may have the capacity to deal with the oxidisers, electrolytes and any contaminated 
waste, although should participate in a competitive tendering process.
Fixed price contracts should be negotiated with the proposed facilities for the demilitarization of the 
ammunition, although the necessary initial infrastructure and equipment requirements should be provided 
by the implementing agency. The production demilitarization contracts should cover receipt, storage, internal 
movement, demilitarization processes, the processing of by-products such as explosives and metals, and the 
disposal of all scrap materials. Negotiated prices for demilitarization will take full account of the assistance given 
to the contractors in the provision of equipment.
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Annex A - Information on Propellant Instability
In March 2000 Dr Stephen Murray from the Royal Military College of Science, at Cranfield University in the 
UK, conducted an analysis of the potential for propellant instability during storage in Albania.   There, storage 
conditions exist that are very similar to those currently found in Montenegro and his report described the following 
hazards associated with propellants in storage:
Propellants may be either Single Base containing only nitrocellulose as the energetic component or Double 
Base containing both nitrocellulose and nitroglycerine as energetic components.  Even if the propellant is kept 
in ideal storage conditions these components will begin to decompose over time to form oxides of nitrogen, 
mainly dinitrogen tetroxide.  If these oxides of nitrogen are not removed from the propellant as they are formed 
they will catalyse further decomposition.  This is an example of auto catalytic decomposition since the impurity 
being formed accelerates the chemistry creating more of the same impurity, which, therefore, causes further 
decomposition and so on.   One factor that can increase the rate of chemical reaction is temperature.  Thus any 
increase above 200C will have an adverse effect on the storage life of propellant.
This autocatalytic decomposition of propellants is a serious safety issue, as it is known to lead to spontaneous 
ignition (see below).  To prevent this occurrence, chemical additives are introduced into the propellant formulation 
and are known as stabilisers.  They do not stop the slow decomposition of the nitrocellulose and nitroglycerine 
but rather prevent the accelerated chemical decomposition by removing the oxides of nitrogen, which would 
cause it to happen.  Thus, the stabiliser reacts chemically with these oxides removing them from the system.  Of 
course, to do this, the stabiliser will slowly be consumed.
Thus, the reduction in stabiliser content will lead to a point where it becomes insufficient to guarantee safety 
and this should be a measure of the storage life of that propellant.  Both chemical analysis and instrumental 
methods can be employed to measure the stabiliser content, the latter being a more recent advance in propellant 
analysis.
Two chemicals are used routinely as stabilisers; one is diphenylamine (DPA) used in Single Base propellants 
from the early years to the present time.  Chemically it behaves as a base reacting with the initial decomposition 
products of nitrocellulose, initially to form nitrosodiphenylamine, which is then converted into various nitro-
derivatives of diphenylamine.  This stabiliser is too basic to be used if nitroglycerine is present and therefore 
is not used in Double Base propellants.  Instead the stabiliser of choice is diphenyldiethylurea also known as 
carbamite or ethyl centralite.  This acts as a weak base reacting with the decomposition products again to form 
nitro- and nitroso-derivatives. The overall chemistry of the action of stabilisers is extremely complex but the end 
result is to keep the propellant chemically stable.
Dr Murray also conducted a survey, which recorded more than 30 ammunition accidents worldwide that were 
attributed to spontaneous propellant ignition.  This has subsequently been updated by SEESAC, who routinely 
provide a list of undesirable explosive events in ammunition storage areas.  There are many causes listed, but 
propellant instability is a cause of statistical significance, with the last event due to this phenomena been in 
Serbia in October 2006 (the Paracin Ammunition Depot Explosion).  Dr Murray concluded, ‘It is imperative that 
all propellant in magazines must be included in a surveillance programme’.
  Ibid, page 28
21
Ammunition Technical Assessment of Montenegro 
(2007-03-04) 
1st Edition
Annex B - Assessment of the Brezovic Ammunition Storage Area
Introduction
Brezovic is an ammunition storage depot of 700,000 m2 
located approximately 90 km from Podgorica. The ammunition 
storage buildings within the explosives area were built by the 
Yugoslavian Army in the 1950s and 1970s and consist of 21 
stone buildings in three different sizes of which 17 will be used 
to store ammunition in future. 
General remarks
The floors of the buildings are clean and free of dust and rubbish. 
Some of the buildings are accessible for forklifts. There is no 
electricity or light in the buildings. Signs are posted indicating 
explosive and fire hazards. Most ammunition is stored on pallets, but some stocks are more than 2 metres high 
due to a lack of capacity. Lightning protection is in place at all buildings. The doors are made of wood, covered 
with an aluminium cover plate and are not up to NATO standard.
Apart from the buildings there are some open storage areas located on the compound, which contain large 
quantities of FAB 100 and FAB 250 bombs and 130 mm ammunition.
Many of the buildings carry large quantities of HD 1.1 and HD 1.2, mostly comprising of artillery and mortar 
ammunitions. One building is used to store ammunition containing White Phosphorous. The majority of the 
ammunition is of Yugoslav and Russian origin and dates from the last 25 years. The ammunition stored in the 
open, mostly aircraft bombs, is suffering considerable deterioration. Almost all of the ammunition is in its original 
packaging.
Good attention is given to the basic rules of storing ammunition and accounting. There are stack-cards in each 
building. Special attention is given to the storage of ammunition containing WP, fuzes and detonators. The rules 
governing the mixing of Compatibility Groups are applied.
Location
The ammunition storage area is located on the side of a hill. Some of the headwalls do not have any traverse or 
other protective arrangements. Some of these buildings face a number of scattered family houses in the valley 
at a distance of approximately 100 metres and more.
To allow the depot to reach its full potential to store the permitted NEQ in HD 1.1 and HD 1.2 remedial action 
needs to be taken.
The vegetation around the buildings should be cleared to obtain a more open area around the buildings.
Buildings
BUILDING 
TYPE
LENGTH 
(M)
WIDTH 
(M)
HEIGHT 
(M)
UNITS OF 
SPACE PER 
ESH (M)
NUMBER OF 
ESH REMARKS
Type A 35.4 12.4 3.75 1,646 16
Type B 35.5 13.3 4.00 1,887 2 Unfit for storage due to construction
Type C 4.4 4.3 3.72 70 3 Only detonators and fuzes
TOTALS 3,603 21
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All buildings are in a reasonable state of repair. Due to misplaced or broken roof tiles most Type A buildings are 
leaking at some places. 
Type B buildings, constructed in 1974, cannot stand heavy snowfall due to a weak roof construction, which has 
already resulted in the collapse of one building and the need for support measures in the other buildings. The 
roofing of is made of Ethernite, which probably contains asbestos. 
Type C buildings are only used for the storage of fuzes and detonators.
Security
Security can be summarised as follows:
ITEM SITUATION RECOMMENDATIONS
Perimeter Fence
There is a 3,400-metre double perimeter fence 
with a separation of approximately 2 metres 
between the fences. Both fences are complete, 
but insufficiently high and robust. There are no 
dogs operated between the fences.
	Repair and refurbish perimeter fence.
Electronic Security
There are no alarms on the ESHs or the 
perimeter.  There is no lighting within the 
ammunition storage area.  There is no CCTV.
	Install lighting system within the 
explosives area.
	Install Intruder detection Systems (IDS) 
or alarms on the ESH.
	Replace current locks with high security 
locks.
Guard Force
The guard force is adequate to secure the 
area, in the absence of any electronic security 
measures.  Any reduction in the guard force 
would severely compromise security. 
Control of access to the storage area is good 
through official entry points.
	Repair and refurbish perimeter fence.
Summary
As BREZOVIC is one of the proposed depots to be used in the future, it has the potential to be a safe and effective 
ammunition storage site however with a reduced number of buildings to store ammunition. The buildings of Type 
B are unfit due to the roof construction and the buildings facing the housing area should also be discarded for 
ammunition storage.
The current standard of safety in storage is adequate. 
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Annex C - Assessment of the Opatovo Ammunition Storage Area
Introduction
Opatovo is an ammunition storage depot located approximately 5 km from the town of Tivat. Opatovo was originally 
an ammunition factory established by Austria during the 1st World War. After the Austrians left it became a Navy 
base for maintenance activities. Since then the property belonged to the Navy. Recently the Arsenal Company 
that also occupies the compound was sold to Mr. Peter Monk, a Canadian of Hungarian origin. The exact legal 
status could not be verified as conflicting answers were given. The assumption is made that the property, and 
thus the responsibility lies with the Armed Forces.
General remarks
The complex is now used by 3 different entities. Mornaricko Technicki Remonit Zavod, Savo Kovacevic, also 
known as Arsenal or MTRZ, officially occupies 15 buildings. Arsenal was an ammunition factory that produced 
grenades, rockets, sea mines, etc. It also had a capacity to fill ammunition with cast TNT. This equipment was only 
used for approximately 6 months and is still present. The company stopped production in 1991 but everything 
is still there and does not belong to the Montenegrin Armed Forces. In the Arsenal buildings there are still many 
explosive articles, (numbers, types and quantities unknown). In buildings 19 and 20 primary explosives are still 
stored, although the condition is also unknown.
TOC is a Technical Experimental Centre (Testing Centre) and occupies 3 buildings, which contain electronic 
equipment. The company has a testing area on Cap Prevlaka, which is now Croatian territory. Since the 1991 
conflict there has been no activity.
The Navy occupies the rest of the buildings. Buildings 68, 71, 72, 73 and 74 are large Igloo-type buildings, partly 
built in the mountainside. They all contain large numbers of sea mines, missile warheads, torpedo charges 
and depth charges. Buildings 13, 24 and 26 contain large quantities of HD 1.1 ammunition but are not really 
designed as storage buildings.
Buildings 11 and 12 belonged to the former Military Department of Tivat but are now Navy. Buildings 10 and 62 
belonged to Arsenal but are now Navy. Building 82 contains furniture.
In the 1990s ammunition was brought to this storage area from the surrounding countries and most of the 
ammunition is still there.
The floors of the buildings are not clean or free of dust and rubbish. Some of the buildings are accessible 
for forklifts. There is electricity or light in some of the buildings. Signs are posted indicating explosive and fire 
hazards. Most ammunition of HD 1.1 is stored on pallets or wooden poles. The majority of this ammunition is 
of Yugoslav and Russian origin and dates from the last 25 years. Almost all of this ammunition is in its original 
packaging. Lightning protection is in place at all buildings. The rules governing the mixing of Compatibility Groups 
are applied.
The doors are not up to NATO standard.
Large quantities of sea mines are ‘stored’ under ‘field conditions’, although much of the area is completely 
overgrown, and therefore a significant fire risk. Some of these mines (AIM–M70) were taken by the Booster 
Company for dismantling, but they were returned as it was not commercially viable for Booster.
Location
The ammunition storage area is located on a hill. The complex, which is vast, is completely run-down. Roads are 
in bad repair, buildings are neglected and the location is overgrown with trees and scrub. In many places all kinds 
of debris can be found, some being ammunition components that have been dismantled. 
24
Ammunition Technical Assessment of Montenegro 
(2007-03-04) 
1st Edition
There is a main road next to the complex, civilian houses next door and high voltage power lines run over the 
complex. 
Security
Security can be summarised as follows:
ITEM SITUATION RECOMMENDATIONS
Perimeter Fence
There is a perimeter fence at some parts of the 
complex, stone walls at other parts. The fences 
and walls are complete, but insufficiently high 
and robust. 
	Nil as planned for closure.Electronic Security
There are no alarms on the ESHs or the 
perimeter.  There is little lighting within the 
ammunition storage area.  There is no CCTV.
Guard Force
The guard force is barely adequate (2 persons) 
to secure the area, in the absence of any 
electronic security measures.  Any reduction 
in the guard force would severely compromise 
security.
Summary
Although initially suitable to store and / or produce ammunition, it is now totally unsuitable as an ammunition 
storage area without significant capital investments. Due to the presence of trees and scrub there is a significant 
fire risk, which would directly involve ammunition. Fire fighting equipment is in short supply and cannot cope with 
a large fire. Last year there was a fire that came close to the ammunition storage buildings but was extinguished 
just in time.
As Opatovo is one of the depots that will not be used in the future, no further recommendations are made, other 
than that the undergrowth should be controlled as an urgent fire prevention measure until the ammunition 
is removed from the facility.
The current standard of safety in storage is totally inadequate. 
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Annex D - Assessment of the Kotor Bay Ammunition Storage Areas
Introduction
The KOTOR Bay ammunition storage area consists of the Petrivici 
depot located in the same area as the Pristan depot and the Spiljici 
depot. The ammunition storage buildings within the explosives 
area were built by the Yugoslavian Army in the late 1940s. The 
ammunition buildings are only divided by general storage buildings 
and workshops. 
Petrovici stores Army ammunition. Spiljici and Pristan store Naval 
ammunition, however there is no clear distinction between the parts 
of the compound. Only Spiljici is separated and can only be reached 
by ship.
Petrovici (see D-1) consists of 3 Igloo type buildings and 2 stone buildings in four different sizes of which none 
will be used to store ammunition in future. Pristan (see D-2) and Spiljici (see D-3) consist of vast underground 
tunnel complexes.
General remarks
The floors of the buildings and tunnels are reasonably clean and free 
of dust and rubbish. Some of the buildings and all of the tunnels are 
accessible for forklifts. There is no electricity or light in the buildings 
but there is electricity and light in the tunnels. Signs are posted 
indicating explosive and fire hazards. Most ammunition is stored on 
pallets. Lightning protection is in place at all buildings and tunnels.
The doors are made of metal, of which some are rusted through, 
others are made of wood but none are up to NATO standard.
The buildings carry large quantities of HD 1.1 and HD 1.2, mostly 
comprising of artillery and mortar ammunitions. The majority of 
the ammunition is of Yugoslav and Russian origin and dates from the last 25 years. The tunnels carry large 
quantities of torpedoes, rockets and naval mines. Many containers carrying oxidizers are stored in the open at 
the waterfront.
Some attention is given to the basic rules of storing ammunition and accounting. The buildings are overloaded, 
(to 125% capacity). There are stack-cards in each building. Special attention is given to the storage of ammunition 
containing WP, fuzes and detonators, however the building is next to the main ammunition storage building. The 
rules governing the mixing of Compatibility Groups are applied.
Location
The ammunition storage area is located on the side of a hill. None of the headwalls have any traverse or 
other protective arrangements. The back of the buildings is built onto the mountain side, which will reflect the 
shockwave in case of a detonation. In front of the Igloos is a fjord-type of water inlet. On the opposite side of the 
fjord is a housing area at approximately 800 m. During the tourist season many boats will be within the danger 
area of the compound.
The vegetation around the buildings should be cleared to obtain a more open area around the buildings. There is 
also a lot of other waste material around that should not be there, (wood, tyres, metal parts, etc).
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D-1  Petrovici
Buildings
BUILDING 
TYPE
LENGTH 
(M)
WIDTH 
(M)
HEIGHT 
(M)
UNITS OF 
SPACE PER 
ESH (M)
NUMBER OF 
ESH REMARKS
Type DSH-36 36.0 12.0 2.6 1,101 222 2
Type M-30 25.4 7.9 4.0 796 125 1
Type M-40 34.5 11.6 3.8 1,500 2 1
Type M-8 5.3 5.6 3.7 103 57 1
TOTALS 3,502 406
All buildings are in a poor to reasonable state of repair. 
World War 2 Ammunition
In the Petrovici area is also a site where WW II ammunition is buried, left behind by German and Italian troops. 
The storage area is, according to local information, approximately 190 metres deep inside the mountain. When 
leaving in 1944 the German / Italian forces detonated charges to block the entrance, and as a result part of the 
mountain collapsed. The entrance also used to be mined although there is no evidence that this is still the case. 
There is no additional information available on the possible contents of this storage bunker. 
Attempts in 1944 and 1945 to re-open the entrance failed due to a lack of resources. Given the fact that the 
ammunition has been buried for over 60 years the situation must be considered as very dangerous. On top of the 
mountain are a number of family houses, which, combined with the Naval offices, workshops and other storage 
areas would be in immediate danger.
Action to re-open the entrance, followed by a probably complex EOD operation is urgently needed. Montenegro 
however does not have a sufficiently trained EOD capacity to deal with this problem. Additional training and 
support would therefore be needed.
D-2  Pristan
Buildings
BUILDING 
TYPE
LENGTH 
(M)
WIDTH 
(M)
HEIGHT 
(M)
UNITS OF 
SPACE PER 
ESH (M)
NUMBER OF 
ESH REMARKS
Tunnels 3,000 ±4.0 ±2.2 26,400 This is a vast complex of tunnels and side tunnels
TOTALS 26,400
All buildings are in a good state of repair. 
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D-3  Spiljici
Buildings
BUILDING 
TYPE
LENGTH 
(M)
WIDTH 
(M)
HEIGHT 
(M)
UNITS OF 
SPACE PER 
ESH (M)
NUMBER OF 
ESH REMARKS
Tunnels 3,000 ±4.0 ±2.2 26,400 This is a vast complex of tunnels and side tunnels
TOTALS 26,400
All buildings are in a good state of repair. 
Security
Security can be summarised as follows:
ITEM SITUATION RECOMMENDATIONS
Perimeter Fence
There is a perimeter fence. The fence is 
complete, but insufficiently high and robust. At 
the side of the waterfront there is no fence at 
all.
	Nil as depot planned for closure.
Electronic Security
There are no alarms on the ESHs or the 
perimeter.  There is no lighting within the 
ammunition storage area.  There is no CCTV.
Guard Force
The guard force is adequate to secure the 
area, in the absence of any electronic security 
measures.  Any reduction in the guard force 
would severely compromise security.
Control of access to the storage area through 
official entry points is good.
Summary
As Petrovici, Pristan and Spiljici are depots that will not be used in the future, no further recommendations are 
made.
The current standard of safety in storage is just adequate, within the caveats above. 
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Annex E - Assessment of the Pljevlja Ammunition Storage Area
Introduction
Pljevlja is an ammunition storage depot located approximately 40 km east of the border with Bosnia and 18 km 
south of the border with Serbia. The ammunition storage buildings within the explosives area were built in the 
1970s and consist of 2 stone buildings of the same size, which will be used to store ammunition in future. 
General remarks
The floors of the buildings are clean and free of dust and rubbish. Both buildings are accessible for forklifts. There 
is no electricity or light in the buildings. Signs are posted indicating explosive and fire hazards. Most ammunition 
is stored on pallets, but some stocks are more than 2 metres high due to a lack of capacity. Lightning protection 
is in place at all buildings.
The doors are made of metal connected to the grounding system but are not up to NATO standard.
Both buildings carry large quantities of HD 1.1 and HD 1.2, mostly comprising of artillery and mortar ammunitions. 
Almost all the ammunition is in its original packaging.
Good attention is given to the basic rules of storing ammunition and accounting. There are stack-cards in each 
building. The rules governing the mixing of Compatibility Groups are applied.
Location
The ammunition storage area is located on the side of a hill within a military area. There is no housing present. 
The nearest guardhouse is at >400 m.
The depot can reach its full potential to store the permitted NEQ in HD 1.1 and HD 1.2 after some remedial action 
is to be taken.
The road to the storage area is in bad condition. The road within the storage area is reasonably good.
Buildings
BUILDING 
TYPE
LENGTH 
(M)
WIDTH 
(M)
HEIGHT 
(M)
UNITS OF 
SPACE PER 
ESH (M)
NUMBER OF 
ESH REMARKS
Type B 24.6 9.1 4.0 200 2 NEQ 40 tonnes TNT
TOTALS 200 2
All buildings are in a reasonable state of repair. 
Type B buildings, constructed in 1974, are of the same construction as the buildings in Brezovik. The roofing of 
the buildings is made of Ethernite, which probably contains asbestos. 
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Security
Security can be summarised as follows:
ITEM SITUATION RECOMMENDATIONS
Perimeter Fence There is a single perimeter fence but insufficiently high and robust.
	Repair and refurbish perimeter fence.
	Repair access road.
Electronic Security
There are no alarms on the ESHs or the 
perimeter.  There is no lighting within the 
ammunition storage area.  There is no CCTV.
	Install lighting system within the 
explosives area.
	Install Intruder detection Systems (IDS) 
or alarms on the ESH.
	Replace current locks with high security 
locks.
Guard Force
The guard force is adequate to secure the 
area, in the absence of any electronic security 
measures.  Any reduction in the guard force 
would severely compromise security.
	Repair and refurbish perimeter fence.
Summary
As Pljevlja is one of the proposed depots to be used in the future, it has the potential to be a safe and effective 
ammunition storage site. 
The current standard of safety in storage is adequate. 
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Annex F - Assessment of the Rogame Ammunition Storage Area
Introduction
Rogame is an ammunition storage depot located approximately 10 km from Podgorica. The ammunition storage 
buildings within the explosives area were built by the Yugoslavian Army in the 1950s and 1970s and consist of 9 
buildings in six different sizes of which none will be used to store ammunition in future. (Unless the MoI choose 
to utilise the facility).
General remarks
The floors of the buildings are clean and free of dust and rubbish. None of the buildings are accessible for 
forklifts. There is no electricity or light in the buildings. Signs are posted indicating explosive and fire hazards. 
Most ammunition is stored on pallets, but some stocks are more than 2 metres high due to a lack of capacity. 
Lightning protection is in place at all buildings.
The doors are made of wood, covered with an aluminium cover plate and are not up to NATO standard.
Many of the buildings carry large quantities of HD 1.1 and HD 1.2, mostly comprising of artillery and mortar 
ammunitions. One building is used to store ammunition containing chemical munitions (smoke, light, etc. for 
the Military Police. The majority of the ammunition is of Yugoslav and Russian origin and dates from the last 25 
years. Almost all of the ammunition is in its original packaging.
Good attention is given to the basic rules of storing ammunition and accounting. There are stack-cards in each 
building. Special attention is given to the storage of ammunition containing fuzes and detonators. The rules 
governing the mixing of Compatibility Groups are applied.
Location
The ammunition storage area is located in a valley surrounded by hills. Some of the headwalls do not have any 
traverse or other protective arrangements. 
Buildings
BUILDING 
TYPE
LENGTH 
(M)
WIDTH 
(M)
HEIGHT 
(M)
UNITS OF 
SPACE PER 
ESH (M)
NUMBER OF 
ESH REMARKS
TYPE 12.0 10.8 5.4 699 3
TYPE 34.7 12.1 2.9 1,191 2
TYPE 12.9 6.6 2.6 221 1
TYPE 25.4 8.0 4.0 812 1
TYPE 12.1 7.3 3.5 309 1
TYPE 5.3 5.3 3.7 103 1
TOTALS 3,337 9
All buildings are in a reasonable state of repair. 
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Security
Security can be summarised as follows:
ITEM SITUATION RECOMMENDATIONS
Perimeter Fence
There is a double perimeter fence with a 
separation of approximately 2 metres between 
the fences. Both fences are complete, but 
insufficiently high and robust. There are no 
dogs operated between the fences.
	Repair and refurbish perimeter fence.
Electronic Security
There are no alarms on the ESHs or the 
perimeter.  There is no lighting within the 
ammunition storage area.  There is no CCTV.
	Install lighting system within the 
explosives area.
	Install Intruder detection Systems (IDS) 
or alarms on the ESH.
	Replace current locks with high security 
locks.
Guard Force
The guard force is adequate to secure the 
area, in the absence of any electronic security 
measures.  Any reduction in the guard force 
would severely compromise security. 
Control of access to the storage area is good 
through official entry points.
	Repair and refurbish perimeter fence.
Summary
As Rogame is one of the depots that will not be used by the Military in the future, no recommendations are 
made.
In case the Ministry of Interior needs a separate storage area for police ammunitions Rogame could be used as it 
is close to the capital and has the capacity and infrastructure to do so. In this case modifications to the buildings 
should be made to comply with NATO Standards.
The current standard of safety in storage is adequate. 
 Only if MoI choose to adopt the facility.
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Annex G - Assessment of the Sasovici Ammunition Storage Area
Introduction
Sasovici is an ammunition storage depot located approximately 10 km from Novi Herzog. The ammunition storage 
buildings within the explosives area were built by the Yugoslavian Army in the late 1940s and early 1950s and 
consist of 13 buildings in different sizes of which none will be used to store ammunition in future. 
7 buildings are of the Igloo type (DSH-30 and DSH-17)
General remarks
The floors of the buildings are clean and free of dust and rubbish, but are broken. None of the buildings is 
accessible for forklifts. There is no electricity or light in the buildings. Signs are posted indicating explosive and 
fire hazards. Most ammunition is stored on wooden poles on the floor, none is palletised. Lightning protection is 
in place at all buildings.
The doors are made of metal, locked and sealed with a lead seal but are not up to NATO standard.
Many of the buildings carry large quantities of HD 1.1 and HD 1.2, mostly comprising of artillery and mortar 
ammunitions. One building has ammunition for naval guns. One building is used to store ammunition containing 
smoke, lachrymatory agents, etc. The majority of the ammunition is of Yugoslav and Russian origin and dates 
from the last 25 years. Almost all of the ammunition is in its original packaging.
Good attention is given to the basic rules of storing ammunition and accounting. There are stack-cards in each 
building. Special attention is given to the storage of ammunition containing smoke, fuzes and detonators. The 
rules governing the mixing of Compatibility Groups are applied.
Location
The ammunition storage area is located on the side of a hill. None of the headwalls have any traverse or other 
protective arrangements. Some of these buildings face a number of scattered family houses in the valley at a 
distance of approximately 400 metres and more.
There is a high-tension power line approximately 60 metres from the first ammunition storage building.
The depot has an area where empty boxes, cartridge casings, etc. are stored.
There is a pond for fire fighting purposes close to the Igloos.
The vegetation around the buildings is cleared to obtain an open area around the buildings.
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Buildings
BUILDING 
TYPE
LENGTH 
(M)
WIDTH 
(M)
HEIGHT 
(M)
UNITS OF 
SPACE PER 
ESH (M)
NUMBER OF 
ESH REMARKS
Type DSH-17 18.0 12.0 2.6 561 6
Type DSH-30 36.0 12.0 2.6 1,123 1
Type M-30 25.4 7.9 4.0 802 1
Type M-5 4.7 4.5 3.6 76 1
Type M-20 25.4 8.0 3.8 772 1
Type -1- 3.4 2.3 2.1 16 1
Type -2- 3.4 1.3 2.1 9 1
TOTALS 3,361 13
All buildings are in a reasonable state of repair. 
The Type 1 building is used for the storage of fuzes and detonators.
The Type 2 building is used to store small quantities of ammunition in bad condition that has been sorted out in 
the first Igloo type building from ammunition returned from Units.
Security
Security can be summarised as follows:
ITEM SITUATION RECOMMENDATIONS
Perimeter Fence
There is a perimeter fence, but insufficiently 
high and robust. There are no dogs operated 
between the fences.
	Nil as planned for closure.
Electronic Security
There are no alarms on the ESHs or the 
perimeter.  There is no lighting within the 
ammunition storage area.  There is no CCTV.
Guard Force
The guard force is adequate to secure the 
area, in the absence of any electronic security 
measures.  Any reduction in the guard force 
would severely compromise security. 
Control of access to the storage area is good 
through official entry points.
Summary
As Sasovici is one of the depots that will not be used in the future, no recommendations are made. The grounds 
of the depot look well maintained, the road is in bad condition. The current standard of safety in storage is 
adequate. 
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Annex H - Assessment of the Taras Ammunition Storage Area
Introduction
Taras is an ammunition storage depot located approximately 30 km from Podgorica. The ammunition storage 
buildings within the explosives area were built by the Yugoslavian Army in the 1950s and 1970s and consist of 
13 stone buildings of which 8 will be used in the future.
General remarks
The floors of the buildings are clean and free of dust and rubbish. Some of the buildings are accessible for 
forklifts. There is no electricity or light in the buildings. Signs are posted indicating explosive- and fire hazards. 
Most ammunition is stored on pallets, some stocks are more than 2 metres high due to a lack of capacity. 
Lightning protection is in place at all buildings.
The doors are made of metal and connected to the grounding system.
The road is in poor condition and needs to be improved. 
Apart from the buildings there are no open storage areas located on the compound.
Near some of the buildings empty pallets were stored.
Buildings
BUILDING 
TYPE
LENGTH 
(M)
WIDTH 
(M)
HEIGHT 
(M)
UNITS OF 
SPACE PER 
ESH (M)
NUMBER OF 
ESH REMARKS
Type D 19.2 12.0 5.4 1,244 4
Type B 36.0 13.5 3.9 1,895 1
Type F 25.7 8.3 3.2 682 1
23.6 8.2 4.2 812 1
5.0 4.0 2.5 50 1 Only detonators and fuzes
TOTALS 4,684 8
All buildings are in a reasonable state of repair. The buildings of Type D are ‘Igloo’ type buildings with an earth 
cover.
The roofing of Type B buildings is of Ethernite, which probably contains asbestos. They are of the same construction 
as the buildings Type B in Brezovic but due to a lesser amount of snow in winter they are safe to use and need 
no extra support.
The Type F building is only used for the storage of fuzes and detonators.
The quality of the doors in the depot is poor and they need either to be repaired or replaced.
Security
Security can be summarized as follows:
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ITEM SITUATION RECOMMENDATIONS
Perimeter Fence There is a perimeter fence, but insufficiently high and robust. 	Repair and refurbish perimeter fence.
Electronic Security
There are no alarms on the ESHs or the 
perimeter.  There is no lighting within the 
ammunition storage area.  There is no CCTV.
	Install lighting system within the 
explosives area.
	Install Intruder detection Systems (IDS) 
or alarms on the ESH.
	Replace current locks with high security 
locks.
	Repair or replace doors on Type E 
Buildings.
Guard Force
The guard force is adequate to secure the 
area, in the absence of any electronic security 
measures.  Any reduction in the guard force 
would severely compromise security. 
Control of access to the storage area is good 
through official entry points.
	Repair and refurbish perimeter fence.
Location
The ammunition storage area is located on the side of a hill. 
To allow the depot to reach its full potential to store the permitted NEQ in HD 1.1 and HD 1.2 remedial action 
needs to be taken.
The vegetation around the buildings should be cleared to obtain a more open area around the buildings.
Summary
Taras is one of the proposed depots to be used in the future, it has the potential to be a safe and effective 
ammunition storage site. 
The current standard of safety in storage is adequate.
Good attention is given to the basic rules of storing ammunition and accounting. There are stack-cards in each 
building. Special attention is given to the storage of ammunition containing fuzes and detonators. The rules 
governing the mixing of Compatibility Groups are applied.
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Annex I - Assessment of the Air Force Ammunition Storage Area
Introduction
The Air Force ammunition storage area is located < 500 metres from the airport at Podgorica. There is one pre-
fabricated ammunition storage building within the explosives area. Primary explosives, fuzes, etc are stored in 
3 containers. Large quantities of bombs are stored in the open. None of the storage space will be used in the 
future.
General remarks
The floors of the building is clean and free of dust and rubbish. The building is accessible for forklifts. There is 
no electricity or light in the building or containers. Signs are posted indicating explosive- and fire hazards. Most 
ammunition is stored on pallets. Lightning protection is in place at the building and the containers. There is a 
road running < 100 metres from the open storage and the storehouse. 
Due to the airfield and the road, the place is totally unsuited for the storage of ammunition in the quantities 
currently there.
Note 
There are 25.8 tonnes of napalm for munitions located in this facility. They should be destroyed as a priority.
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Annex M – Definitions
The definitions used in this assessment are in accordance with the definitions contained in RMDS/G 02.10 
(Guideline) Edition 4, 20 July 2006 – Glossary of SALW terms and abbreviations.
M.1.1 
accident
an undesired event, which results in harm 
Note:	 Modified	from	definition	in	OHSAS	18001:1999,
M.1.2 
ammunition
See munition
M.1.3 
deflagration
the conversion of explosives into gaseous products by chemical reactions at or near the surface of the explosive 
(cf detonation).
M.1.4 
demilitarisation
the complete range of processes that render weapons, ammunition, mines and explosives unfit for their originally 
intended purpose. 2
Demilitarisation not only involves the final destruction process, but also includes all of the other transport, 
storage, accounting and pre-processing operations that are equally as critical to achieving the final result.
M.1.5 
destruction
the process of final conversion of weapons, ammunition, mines and explosives into an inert state that can no 
longer function as designed.
M.1.6 
detonator
a device containing a sensitive explosive intended to produce a detonation wave.  [AAP-6]
M.1.7 
detonation
the rapid conversion of explosives into gaseous products by means of a shock wave passing through the explosive 
(c.f. deflagration).  Typically, the velocity of such a shock wave is more than two orders of magnitude higher than 
a fast deflagration).
M.1.8 
diurnal cycling
the exposure of ammunition and explosives to the temperature changes induced by day, night and change of 
season.  
M.1.9 
disposal site
an area authorised for the destruction of ammunition and explosives by detonation and burning. 
M.1.10 
explosives
a substance or mixture of substances, which, under external influences, is capable of rapidly releasing energy in 
the form of gases and heat.  [AAP-6].
2  IMAS 11.10.
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M.1.11 
explosive materials
components or ancillary items, which contain some explosives, or behave in an explosive manner, such as 
detonators and primers.
M.1.12 
explosive ordnance
all munitions containing explosives, nuclear fission or fusion materials and biological and chemical agents.  This 
includes bombs and warheads; guided and ballistic missiles; artillery, mortar, rocket and small arms ammunition; 
all mines, torpedoes and depth charges; pyrotechnics; clusters and dispensers; cartridge and propellant actuated 
devices; electro-explosive devices; clandestine and improvised explosive devices; and all similar or related items 
or components explosive in nature. [AAP-6]
M.1.13 
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)
the detection, identification, evaluation, render safe, recovery and final disposal of unexploded explosive 
ordnance. It may also include the rendering-safe and/or disposal of such explosive ordnance, which have become 
hazardous by damage or deterioration, when the disposal of such explosive ordnance is beyond the capabilities 
of those personnel normally assigned the responsibility for routine disposal. 
The presence of ammunition and explosives during SALW Control operations will inevitably require some degree 
of EOD response.  The level of this response will be dictated by the condition of the ammunition, its level of 
deterioration and the way that it is handled by the local community.  
M.1.14 
fuze
a device, which initiates an explosive train. [AAP-6] 
M.1.15 
lachrymatory ammunition
lachrymatory ammunition contains chemical compounds that are designed to incapacitate by causing short-term 
tears or inflammation of the eyes.
M.1.16 
magazine
any building, structure or container approved for the storage of explosive materials.
M.1.17 
munition
a complete device charged with explosives, propellants, pyrotechnics, initiating composition, or nuclear, biological 
or chemical material for use in military operations, including demolitions.  [AAP-6].
Note: In common usage, ‘munitions’ (plural) can be military weapons, ammunition and equipment.
M.1.18 
NATO
(North Atlantic Treaty Organisation)
  UN Guidelines for Stockpile Destruction, June 2000.
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M.1.19 
primer
a self-contained munition which is fitted into a cartridge case or firing mechanism and provides the means of 
igniting the propellant charge.
M.1.20 
safe 
the absence of risk.  Normally the term tolerable risk is more appropriate and accurate.
M.1.21 
Safe to Move
a technical assessment, by an appropriately qualified technician or technical officer, of the physical condition and 
stability of ammunition and explosives prior to any proposed move.
Note: Should the ammunition and explosives fail a ‘Safe to Move’ inspection, then they must be 
destroyed	in	situ,	or	as	close	as	is	practically	possible,	by	a	qualified	EOD	team	acting	under	the	advice	and	
control	of	the	qualified	technician	or	technical	officer	who	conducted	the	initial	Safe	to	Move	inspection.
M.1.22 
safety
the reduction of risk to a tolerable level.  [ISO Guide 51:1999(E)]
degree of freedom from unacceptable risk.   [ISO Guide 51: 1999(E)]
M.1.23 
Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)
all lethal conventional munitions that can be carried by an individual combatant or a light vehicle, that also do 
not require a substantial logistic and maintenance capability.
Note:	 There	are	a	variety	of	definitions	for	SALW	circulating	and	international	consensus	on	a	‘correct’	
definition	has	yet	to	be	agreed.		For	the	purposes	of	RMDS/G	the	above	definition	will	be	used.
M.1.24 
standard
a standard is a documented agreement containing technical specifications or other precise criteria to be used 
consistently as rules, guidelines, or definitions of characteristics to ensure that materials, products, processes 
and services are fit for their purpose.
Note:	 RMDS/G	 aim	 to	 improve	 safety	 and	 efficiency	 in	 SALW	Control	 by	 promoting	 the	 preferred	
procedures	and	practices	at	both	headquarters	and	field	level.		To	be	effective,	the	standards	should	be	
definable,	measurable,	achievable	and	verifiable.
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M.1.25 
standing operating procedures  (SOPs)
standard operating procedures
instructions, which define the preferred or currently established method of conducting an operational task or 
activity.  
Note: Their purpose is to promote recognisable and measurable degrees of discipline, uniformity, 
consistency and commonality within an organization, with the aim of improving operational effectiveness 
and	safety.		SOPs	should	reflect	local requirements and circumstances.
M.1.26 
stockpile
in the context of SALW, the term refers to ….. a large accumulated stock of weapons and EO.
M.1.27 
stockpile destruction
the physical activities and destructive procedures leading to a  reduction of the national stockpile.
M.1.28 
stockpile management
those procedures and activities regarding SALW safety and security in accounting, storage, transportation and 
handling.
M.1.29 
tolerable risk
risk, which is accepted in a given context based on the current values of society. [ISO Guide 51: 1999 (E)]
M.1.30 
Unexploded Ordnance (UXO)
explosive ordnance which has been primed, fuzed, armed or otherwise prepared for action, and which has 
been dropped, fired, launched, projected, or placed in such a manner as to constitute a hazard to operations, 
installations, personnel or material and remains unexploded either by malfunction or design or for any other 
cause. 
  NATO Definition.
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